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ABSTRACT 
HOW DO THE RECENT DISCOVERIES OF OFFSHORE ISRAELI AND 
CYPRIOT GAS AFFECT THE REGION’S GEOPOLITICS? 
 
 
ECE DEMİR 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2014 
Supervisor: Ahmet O. Evin 
 
 
Key Words: Natural gas power plant, Petrol Pipelines, Natural gas pipelines. 
 
 
The effect of the recent discoveries of offshore Israeli and Cypriot gas on the region's 
geopolitics is the main focus of this study. The questions regarding the topic are 
answered in two chapters. In the first chapter, possible economic and political effects of 
offshore explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean are analyzed. The economic, 
financial and export potential of the resources is investigated in terms of the countries 
that claim the resources, particularly those of Egypt, Israel and Cyprus in the content of 
thesis political and historical relations with their neighbors. In the second chapter, 
possible investment and export options that may bring a solution to the challenges are 
proposed in terms of scenarios, and every scenario is analyzed in terms of its political, 
economic and regional effect. The six scenarios that are analyzed in this thesis follows: 
Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline, Israel's possibility of using the gas for regional peace, Pipeline 
to Turkey, Floating LNG Facility, East-Med Pipeline Project and Vassilikos LNG 
Terminal. These scenarios are presented hierarchically in terms of their relative 
effectiveness.  
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ÖZET 
SON DÖNEMDE İSRAİL VE KIBRIS AÇIKLARINDA YAPILAN GAZ 
KEŞİFLERİ BÖLGENİN JEOPOLİTİĞİNİ NASIL ETKİLİYOR? 
 
 
ECE DEMİR 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2014 
Danışman: Ahmet O. Evin 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Doğal gaz enerji santrali, Petrol boru hatları, Doğal gaz boru 
hatları. 
 
 
Son dönemde İsrail ve Kıbrıs açıklarında yapılan gaz keşiflerinin Doğu Akdeniz 
jeopolitiğine etkisi bu çalışmanın ana konusudur. Konuyla ilgili sorular iki bölümde 
yanıtlanmaya çalışılmıştır.  İlk bölümde Doğu Akdeniz kıyılarında geçmişte yapılmış ve 
hali hazırda yapılmakta olan açık deniz doğal gaz araştırmaları ve bu araştırmalardan 
çıkacak ekonomik ve siyasal sonuçlar ele alınmıştır. Kaynakların finansman, kullanım 
ve potansiyel ekonomik değeri bu kaynakları sahiplenen ülkeler bazında incelenmiş, 
özellikle İsrail, Mısır ve Kıbrıs'ın komşuları ve bölgedeki diğer ülkelerle tarihsel ve 
politik ilişkileri göz önünde tutularak irdelenmiştir. İkinci kısımda ise, bu soruna çözüm 
getirebileceği düşünülen olası yatırım ve ihracat senaryoları ele alınıp incelenmiş, her 
bir senaryonun ekonomik politik ve uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında sebep olabileceği 
etkiler analiz edilmiştir. İrdelenen senaryolar Arish-Ashkelon Boru Hattı, İsrail'in gazı 
bölgesel barış için kullanması, Türkiye'den geçirilecek bir boru hattı projesi, 
Sıvılaştırılmış Doğal Gaz (LNG) İşleme Gemisi, Doğu Akdeniz Boru Hattı Projesi ve 
Vassilikos Doğal Gaz Terminali olmak üzere altı tanedir. Tez, bu senaryoları etkinlik 
derecesine göre sınıflandırmaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Pursuit for energy resources is one the most important interests a country would 
have since the industrial revolution. Since the 19th century, countries waged war with 
one another just to acquire a coal mining city in order to secure their coal supplies for 
the factories at home. It would be a mistake to make the assumption of all the major 
wars after the industrial revolution were caused by pursuit of securing energy resources. 
Countries, however, still needed to have a secure line of energy supply in order to have 
a stable economy even if the main causes of wars were not energy itself. This makes the 
pursuit of energy resources a highly important subject on which to focus in order to 
understand the economic development of a country, as well as its relationship with other 
countries. 
 
After World War II, in order make war impossible, six European countries 
signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951 which established the European Coal and Steel 
Community. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the idea of a 
supranational body to prevent a possible future war between Germany and France. Aim 
was to create a common market which would make waging a war too costly for 
economies of the countries. Thus, countries had to be in good terms with one another 
for their material interests. This example is a proof that, by using energy resources, 
countries can establish international bodies to stop themselves from waging war with 
one another, have peaceful relationships and cooperation with each other and thereby 
not only achieve economic stability at home, but also economic development and 
growth.  
 
Eastern Mediterranean natural gas findings in the past ten years make the region 
an interesting area for research to understand the effects of these natural gas reserves on 
the geopolitics of the region and beyond. Israel holds the most gas reserves in the region 
with Tamar and Leviathan gas fields. Cyprus discovered significant offshore natural gas 
reserves. After the discovery of these large gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
several challenges arose because of the complex politics and geopolitics of the region. 
Because of the unstable geopolitical landscape, countries with natural gas reserves 
continue to argue about how to monetize their resources and maximize their return from 
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this reserves. Natural gas discoveries surely would bring potential benefits and risks not 
only to countries which have the resources, but also to countries without resources 
which would have an interest to buy natural gas from those who have.  
 
Potential benefits of their natural gas resources are countless for Israel, Cyprus, 
the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon. One of the most important benefits is the 
decreasing reliance on energy imports from uncertain suppliers, as well as stabilization 
of electricity supplies at more competitive prices. There exists a chance for the 
improved trade balance and gross domestic product (GDP) for the aforementioned 
countries, as well as sounder public finances through increased tax revenues that would 
lead to the possibility of increased investment in upstream and downstream industries, 
leaning to economic diversification. Based on natural gas, a cleaner energy mix could 
be achieved as well as more abundant water supplies from desalinization plants fuelled 
by natural gas and potentially less conflict in the region over water.1 
 
Benefits also do exist for the European Union in various areas. By putting its 
support behind Cypriot natural gas developments, the EU can ensure the economic 
stability of Cyprus, thus the stability of the Euro zone. Cyprus is one of the five 
countries that had to get a bailout from European Union after the Euro crisis. 
Strengthening of the economy of the EU member state Cyprus is of interest to the EU; 
thus, support for Cypriot natural gas is a potential way to accelerate economic 
development of Cyprus. Cypriot natural gas can also increase the EU’s overall energy 
security by means of Cyprus gas exports to EU member states. One of the main goals of 
the EU for energy security is to reduce reliance on Russian natural gas supply and 
diversification of gas sources. This can be attained by supporting other natural gas 
development efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the Israeli gas fields, 
Leviathan and Tamar. The European Union’s involvement in energy developments in 
the Eastern Mediterranean would increase the EU’s foreign policy capabilities since 
involvement in the region would make the EU an important actor in the region rather 
than being merely an observer. 
 
                                                          
1 Michael Leigh, “Preliminary Reports and Recommendations on Energy Resources in the Eastern 
Mediterranean: Source for Cooperation or Fuel for Tension”, German Marshall Fund, 2012 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339170753Leigh_SummaryDocument_Jun12_maps.pdf 
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The discovery of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean also holds potential 
benefits for Turkey. Natural gas reserves in the region can serve as a source of natural 
gas diversification for Turkey, a country that seeks to reduce its natural gas dependency 
on Russia. By accessing revenues earned from energy production, Turkish Cypriots 
would see a reduction in their economic dependency on Turkey. This would mean that 
Turkey can correspondingly reduce its direct economic assistance to the Turkish 
Cypriots and focus on other areas of cooperation, while the Turkish Cypriots would be 
able to cover substantial amount of their budgetary needs by their earnings from energy 
resources. If political circumstances allow the transport of gas from the Eastern 
Mediterranean to Europe through Turkey, interest in the Southern Corridor and offshore 
explorations in Turkey potentially can increase.  
 
As the region is a highly troubled one, there are numerous political risks that 
may arise from these developments. First option that comes to mind is the possible 
delimitation disputes that may arise between Israel and Lebanon and between Cyprus 
and Turkey. Such disputes are likely to be aggrandized by the existing conflicts in the 
region such as the division of Cyprus, Israel’s state of war with Lebanon, the Israeli – 
Palestinian conflict and tensions between Israel and Turkey following the Gaza flotilla 
incident. Ongoing regional turmoil and the uncertainties concerning the political 
regimes in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt also points to potential security risks. 
The effect of the recent discoveries of offshore Israeli and Cypriot natural gas 
reserves on Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics is the main focus of this study. This work 
undertakes to investigate the following questions in two chapters: 
Chapter One, “Offshore Explorations In East Mediterranean”, aims to explore 
past and current developments in the Eastern Mediterranean region by focusing on three 
countries, namely Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. This chapter will explore the relationship of 
each of these three countries with its neighbors as well as its role in the region. It will 
then examine their natural gas resources and potential role as energy producers, in 
particular, as suppliers and consumers of natural gas.  
Chapter Two, “East-Mediterranean Natural Gas Scenarios”, intends to 
investigate the possible scenarios that Israel and Cyprus can choose from to develop 
their natural gas reserves. This chapter will present six scenarios. The first scenario, 
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Arish-Ashkelon, suggests Israel exporting its natural gas to Egypt through the existing 
Arish-Ashkelon pipeline. The second scenario, Peace, explores possible peace-building 
measures that Israel can choose to extend to Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine. The third 
scenario, Turkey, examines the possibility of Israeli natural gas export by building 
pipelines through the Turkish territory. The fourth scenario, Floating LNG Facility, 
gives a brief explanation of how FLNG facilities work and its possible application in 
Eastern Mediterranean. The fifth scenario, Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline Project, 
deals with building a pipeline from Israel to European Union through Cypriot and Greek 
territories. The sixth and last scenario, Vassilikos LNG Terminal, involves building an 
LNG terminal in Cyprus for Cypriot natural gas and possible supply of Israeli natural 
gas through Cyprus. 
There have been a broad range of studies published on eastern Mediterranean 
natural gas ever since the discovery respectively of offshore resources by Israel and 
Cyprus. In addition to technical and economic aspects, these studies have considered the 
geopolitical, security and legal aspects of prospecting, extracting and transporting these 
newly found resources. The following subsection examines in detail the existing 
literature and academic studies on this topic. 
i. Existing Studies On The Subject 
Making comparative analyses of the potential benefits and distribution 
possibilities of the Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons, especially the Israeli and 
Cypriot resources, is a new concept, at least not as old the rest of the energy politics 
literature. Although reliable analyses and reports do exist, the literature is still limited 
due to the fact that research on Eastern Mediterranean natural gas reserves is relatively 
new. Despite the lack of extensive academic work done on the newly discovered East-
Med Hydrocarbons, research on the topic has been reinforced by the credibility of data 
provided by companies engaged in drilling, official sources and international agencies, 
such as the U.S. geological survey. The available data moreover, have been 
disseminated by the news media. As a result, there appeared in the brief period of time 
several significant studies that are taken into consideration in this subsection. 
Written by Simone Tagliapietra from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Towards a 
New Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor? Natural Gas Developments between 
Market Opportunities and Geopolitical Risks is one of the few important papers that can 
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be used for a research on the Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons. The author provides 
a comprehensive overview on the regional developments and proposes some critical 
discussion of the market opportunities and geopolitical risks related to the potential 
emergence of the new Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor.2 
 Starting with the series of events that keep reshuffling the political equilibrium 
of the region, such as the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, Turkey’s claims being a 
regional leader, the tensions between Israel and Gaza, and the never-ending dispute 
between Turkey and Republic of Cyprus, Tagliapietra continues by explaining the 
developments that reshuffle another equilibrium in the region: energy. Tagliapietra 
claims that natural gas findings in the offshore Egypt, Israel and Cyprus are reshaping 
the regional energy map and rapidly making the Eastern Mediterranean a world-class 
gas province. The work addresses the Arab Gas Network as the most ambitious project 
of the natural gas cooperation ever attempted in the region, which is one of the most 
important statements of the paper.  
Michael Leigh and Charlotte Brandsma’s joint paper, published under the 
Brussels Forum, Energy Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean: Source for 
Cooperation or Fuel for Tension3 is also an important source on addressing the 
geopolitical dilemmas and security concerns that may arise from the discoveries. The 
paper also makes references to the relations of the parties concerned and challenges in 
terms of infrastructure, financing, security, environmental protection, revenue sharing 
and political relations. The fact that the EU and the United States have an interest in 
preventing hostilities and in ensuring that new energy resources are developed for the 
benefit of the region as a whole is one of the far reaching arguments of the paper.  
Tulio Scovazzi’s GMF report on the Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea4 is a significant source for gaining an understanding on the nature 
                                                          
2 Simone Tagliapietra, “Towards A New Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor? Natural Gas 
Developments Between Market Opportunities And Geopolitical Risks”, Fodazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 
2013. 
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/2013215105594NDL2013-012.pdf 
3 Michael Leigh, Charlotte Brandsma, “Energy Resources In The Eastern Mediterranean: Source For 
Cooperation Or Fuel For Tension”, Brussels Forum, 2012. 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/leigh_brandsma_easternmedenergy_bf12.pdf 
4TullioScovazzi, “Maritime Boundaries In The Eastern Mediterranean Sea”, German Marshall Fund Of 
The United States, 2012. 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339504227Scovazzi_MaritimeBoundaries_Jun12.pdf 
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and extent of maritime zones, debated concepts as contiguous zone, exclusive economic 
zone, continental shelf, and high seas. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
is also examined in a historical dimension, taking into account the clashing interests and 
the significant roles of the parties that intervened (or did not intervene like Turkey) in 
the process. It makes references to maritime delimitation treaties concluded by Eastern 
Mediterranean states in trying to answer the open questions of the particular maritime 
delimitation in the East-Med Sea.  
There are also country-based reports on East-Med Hydrocarbons, like Toula 
Onoufriou’s GMF report, Cyprus – a Future Energy Hub?5 The author examines the 
case from a Cypriot point of view, analyzing the case as an opportunity for the island to 
pay its debt and recover its economy from its economic crisis. Although Onoufriou’s 
report has some weak arguments, such as her claim that there is nothing in the region 
that may discourage potential investors, it does gives some hints about an academic 
view on the possible scenarios regarding revenue sharing.  
Another country-based report from GMF is the Rivalry in the Eastern 
Mediterranean: the Turkish Dimension by Mehmet Öğütçü6. Öğütçü starts by 
explaining the political context and Turkey’s Energy Policy, followed by Turkey’s 
response to gas discoveries by Cyprus and Israel, and continues with questioning a 
possible new alignment in the Mediterranean. The author suggests that, in the absence 
of mutually agreed maritime boundaries, the possibility of joint development of 
offshore energy resources, or at least a more coordinated approach should be considered 
without prejudice to respective positions on long-standing political problems. There is 
also an emphasis on the fact that Turkey and its neighbors need to avoid harsh rhetoric 
and brinkmanship; instead, pending solutions of bilateral differences, they should 
consider interim agreements to reduce risk and allow exploration and production to go 
ahead in a more predictable environment.  
Another country-based report of the GMF is the Energy Discoveries in the 
Eastern Mediterranean: Source for Cooperation or Fuel for Tension? The Case of 
                                                          
5ToulaOnoufriou, “Cyprus – a Future Energy Hub?”, German Marshall Fund Of The United States, 2012. 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1349894204Onoufriou_CyprusEnergy_Oct12.pdf 
6Mehmet Öğütçü, “Rivalry In The Eastern Mediterranean: The Turkish Dimension”, German Marshall 
Fund Of The United States, 2012. 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339171647Ogutcu_EasternMedRivalry_Jun12.pdf 
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Israel by Simon Henderson.7 This policy brief starts with Henderson giving a general 
account of the energy overview of the current development stage in Israel. Henderson 
argues that Tamar field would be enough to satisfy current domestic consumption when 
it comes on-stream and Leviathan field would make Israel a significant energy exporter 
when the production begins in 2017. Henderson lists several options on how to export 
natural gas which are; LNG, pipeline or export of electricity produced by natural gas via 
submerged cables. He illustrates positive aspects of these options as well as negative 
aspects. Henderson also explains political and security challenges of the listed options. 
Another GMF Policy Brief, by Michael Koehler is Gas Discoveries in the 
Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for the European Union8. Koehler says that global 
demand for natural gas supplies is increasing and Europe will require substantial growth 
in both oil and gas imports in the next 10 to 20 years. Koehler than continues to list the 
reasons why the EU needs to be involved in the Eastern Mediterranean gas issues: 
reasons; they are mainly the energy security of Cyprus, Israel, and Palestinian authority 
but also EU’s own energy security. These energy resources need to be developed as part 
of a balanced, overall energy strategy. According to Koehler, European Union has an 
interest in the stability of this region; Turkey also shares the EU’s interest in regional 
stability. Due to the turmoil in Syria and political uncertainties, security of energy 
installations is important for all Mediterranean countries.  
A policy paper from BST, a GMF project, written by Dorothée Schmid is titled 
as Towards an Energy Revolution in the Eastern Mediterranean: Any Positive Effect for 
the EU?9 Schmid argues that due to recent giant gas discoveries in the Levant, the EU 
should change its approach from long periods of planning and rhetorical deliberation to 
a more practical and active format. According to Schmid there is no doubt that the 
Levant-originated gas would have an impact on the EU’s future economic outlook but it 
is hard to forecast, according to him, the magnitude of such an impact because different 
                                                          
7 Simon Henderson, “Natural Gas Exports For Israel and Cyprus”, German Marshall Fund, 2013. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Henderson20130901-
NaturalGasExportOptions.pdf 
8 Michael Koehler, “Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for the European 
Union”, German Marshall Fund, 2012. 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1351282654Koehler_GasDiscoveriesEU_Oct12.pdf 
9DorothéeSchmid, “Towards an Energy Revolution in the Eastern Mediterranean: Any Positive Effect for 
the EU?”, Center For International and European Studies, 2013. 
http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/NeighbourhoodPolicyPaper(12).pdf 
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scenarios regarding on Levant gas resources can yield different geopolitical results. 
Schmid argues that states would get into a power struggle to control these new 
resources. She also gives some early recommendations to the EU about how not to lose 
its political influence in the region by actions it can take. 
The last GMF report used in this article is by Jeffrey Mankoff, Resource Rivalry 
in the Eastern Mediterranean: The View from Washington10. The author states that the 
United States welcomed the discovery of gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean over 
the past decade as these resources can bolster the energy security of Israel, Cyprus and 
Europe as a whole and reduce, to some degree, the European Union’s dependence on 
exports from Russia. The US also supports Turkey’s future involvement in the East-
Med natural gas when and if political circumstances permit. The article also keeps 
emphasizing the fact that United States is seeking to avoid escalation of tensions in the 
region.  
Michael Leigh’s Preliminary Reports and Recommendations on Energy 
Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean: Source for Cooperation or Fuel for Tension11 
is like a bibliography for the ideas stated in GMF policy briefs, and Mediterranean 
Policy papers. Leigh gives an introduction of five reports written on the opportunities 
and risks of Eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries. This paper includes list of 
recommendations and benefits towards the regional countries as well as for European 
Union and United States.   
The Prio Report on Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future 
Scenarios12, written by Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen and Harry Tzimitras represents one of 
the most detailed researches on the area. The study focuses on the case of Cyprus, by 
examining the relevant developments from the legal, political and economic 
perspective. The report starts with a summary of the recent natural gas discoveries in the 
region and continues by assessing the significance of finds offshore Cyprus. As they 
                                                          
10 Jeffrey Mankoff, “Resource Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean: The View from Washington”, 
German Marshall Fund, 2012. 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339093526Mankoff_ResourceRivalry_Jun12.pdf 
11 Michael Leigh, “Preliminary Reports and Recommendations on Energy Resources in the Eastern 
Mediterranean: Source for Cooperation or Fuel for Tension”, German Marshall Fund, 2012 
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339170753Leigh_SummaryDocument_Jun12_maps.pdf 
12 Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen and Harry Tzimitras, “Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and 
Future Scenarios”, Prio Report, 2013. 
http://www.prio.no/Global/upload/Cyprus/Publications/Hydrocarbons_Report-ENG.pdf 
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examine the legal framework of maritime delineation in the region, they focus, in 
particular, on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention) 
as well as the reasons why the neighboring Turkey objects to certain UNCLOS articles, 
and therefore why it has not signed the Convention. There is also a detailed analysis on 
the maritime jurisdiction disputes in the region which relate to Cyprus, including the 
dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea and the maritime border dispute 
between Israel and Lebanon. The authors made connections between the historical 
positions on the Cyprus problems and dispute about sovereignty, and positions on 
hydrocarbons exploration of various parties involved in the dispute.  
Clarifying Turkey’s approach to explorations in the southern and northern parts 
of Cyprus to these developments, and the response of the international community, 
authors explain that, while it is clear that the international community supports the right 
of the (de facto Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to explore oil and gas, it also 
has strong expectations that the hydrocarbons revenues will be shared with the Turkish 
Cypriot Community in the event of a solution to the Cyprus problem. The steps taken 
by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in response to the Greek Cypriot gas exploration is 
taken into account. In particular, the “policy of reciprocity”, whereby the exploration by 
Greek Cypriots is met with exploration by Turkish Cypriots (with Turkey’s 
collaboration) in areas to which the Turkish Cypriots feel they have an equal claim is 
explained. Potential attempts by Turkey to explore natural gas in areas claimed by 
Turkey as part of its continental shelf, some of which overlaps with the exclusive 
economic zone proclaimed by the RoC are also discussed. 
The second part in which the export options open to the RoC are examined was 
used as a roadmap in the writing of this paper. Authors agreed that RoC must wait 
longer before construction of an LNG plant can begin, because financing a small 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant would be difficult if there will not be any additional 
volumes coming from further explorations in the second licensing round or from Israeli 
resources. Another option, which will bring revenue, sooner than an LNG plant, would 
be a pipeline to Turkey, which is not possible unless there is an agreement on the 
Cyprus problem. Outlining the positions of the parties, the authors seek to find the 
Cyprus problem solution scenarios and possible export options for each scenario. 
Simulating varieties of options from best to worst, authors argue that a scenario similar 
to the status quo—official negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem on-going but no 
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real progress in practice—is the most likely. The extent to which this scenario affects 
whether or how fast the RoC can earn hydrocarbons revenue will depend to a large 
degree on factors that are out of its hands, namely on whether Israel would export its 
natural gas with Cypriot cooperation or not, which is an important variable. Under a 
status quo scenario, gas revenue flowing to Greek Cypriots would be most vulnerable if 
Israel and Turkey were to make friends and Israel took up Turkey’s recent offer to pipe 
gas from Israel to Turkey. 
Oxford Energy Journal, a quarterly journal for debating energy issues and 
policies, was also a fruitful source for making a research on East-Med Hydrocarbons. 
Issue 93 was dedicated to East Mediterranean Gas, and exploring the complex of web 
geopolitics and energy policy that provides the backdrop to the new gas province 
emerging in the East Mediterranean. The issue starts with Trevor Sikorski’s detailed 
overview of the changing face of the global LNG market with the East-Med gas’ entry 
to the game. Sikorski argues that when the projects come into practice, the LNG market 
will be different from today, as Qatar will lose its pre-eminent position as Australia and 
the USA will be making major inroads. Author projects greater competition will arise 
among LNG sellers, higher transparency on pricing, leading Asian buyers to move away 
from oil-indexed pricing. He also argues that Russia’s response to these developments 
will be key to the state of European LNG market, where East Mediterranean cargoes are 
likely to end up. Laura El-Katiri frames the regional context for the East Mediterranean 
gas revolution and claims that the gas exports from the region will be the center of 
attention. El-Katiri argues that last few years saw substantial growth in domestic power 
demand and that new natural gas producers will have an economic advantage as they 
would easily supply less expansive natural gas to their domestic market which would 
reduce costly oil-fired power generation. The author looks beyond the political issues 
that have so far prevented substantial cross-border energy flows, to consider the 
potential benefits for the growing number of regional energy-deficit countries, 
geostrategic interests will ultimately condition these outcomes.13 
Joseph Paritzky and Bill Farren-Price discuss the current and future impact of 
gas on Israel’s dependence on energy imports and obstacles that may occur on export 
process on LNG or pipeline, in the face of domestic political opposition or technical 
                                                          
13 Oxford Energy Forum, Issue 93, Ed. Bassam Fatouh 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/OEF-93.pdf 
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security challenges. They taking into account various scenarios that may be applied, 
while export process, such as cooperation with Cyprus or a pipeline to Turkey – if the 
requisite political changes do happen.  
Leigh Elston and Peter Stewart argue that the Israeli government’s decision to 
limit exports to the gas discoveries at 40 per cent of the proven resources is made as a 
policy decision with the aim to give an increase to gas development, while leaving 
enough gas for the expanding domestic market. They discuss the complications that 
arise from the Israeli political objections to the gas export decision and various 
monetization options for Israeli resource holders. 
According to Matthew J.Bryza, the Israel-Turkey gas pipeline is the most 
commercially efficient export option for the Israeli gas, and an influence and a possible 
guarantee on regional stability, which will be possible in an environment on smoother 
diplomatic relations between two countries and in further political work between 
Cyprus and Turkey. 
Ayla Gürel examines the difficulties that arise from the Cyprus problem for 
regional energy integration. While options for a pipeline carrying gas from Cyprus and 
potentially from Israel and other producers in region, to Turkey and onwards to other 
South-Eastern European buyers discussed, an exploration on the positions of Turkey, 
Cyprus and the international community to offshore gas development as well as the 
issue of resource sovereignty made. 
Charles Ellinas provides a Cypriot perspective and outlines the country’s gas 
export strategy, make projections on future demand for Cypriot gas in Europe and 
explains Nicosia’s decision on adopting LNG as its primary gas export option. Ellinas 
considers Cyprus as a liquefaction hub for Israeli and Lebanese gas, but he also states 
the economic and competitive risks looming in terms of shale gas and the uncertain 
global economic outlook.  
Possibility of Cyprus’ newly-found hydrocarbons playing an important role on 
the overcoming the banking and fiscal crisis can be taken into account, soon after 
appraisal drilling and fresh exploration are undertaken, and the reserves are understood 
better, says Anastasios Giamouridis.  
12 
 
Dimitris Manolis and Elsa Loverdos’ article is on DEPA’s proposed East-Med 
pipeline project, running from the offshore fields to Cyprus and onwards to Crete and 
Greece. They point out that the EU’s strategy of diversifying its energy import sources 
can be reinforced with such a project, and the competition among the producers can be 
increased. Although there are some drawbacks of LNG, taking the LNG route would 
place Cyprus in competition with other lower-cost producers feeding the Asian market.  
Gerald Butt points to the diversity of the Turkish energy policy: a strategy that 
now will favor oil and gas from northern Iraq over prospective supply from the East 
Mediterranean. Butt is skeptical about prospects for the resolution of Eastern 
Mediterranean political entanglements and instead argues that Ankara will persist with 
its political and capital investments in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
Another guideline-formatted paper on this research was the Natural Gas Export 
Options for Israel and Cyprus by Simon Henderson.14 Stating the newly gained 
positions as energy exporters of Israel and Cyprus, by the recent discoveries, Henderson 
points that depth and distance of the resources from the both countries, and suggests 
solutions to diplomatic and technical challenges that may arise from the situation. 
Another obstacle that increases the challenges in decision-making process is the 
possibility of finding additional significant gas fields, and even exploitable oil deposits. 
While Henderson develops a range of export options, both by pipeline and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) and even in electricity, he points the likelihood of cooperation 
between Cyprus and Israel, and Cyprus being an important element in each country’s 
successful exploitation of the new-found riches. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Simon Henderson, “Natural Gas Exports For Israel and Cyprus”, German Marshall Fund, 2013. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Henderson20130901-
NaturalGasExportOptions.pdf 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
This chapter deals with the examination of the past and current developments in 
the Eastern Mediterranean region by focusing on Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. The reason 
for choosing these three countries is that all of them have significant proven natural gas 
reserves. Also, the three countries’ relationship with other regional actors affects the 
geopolitical landscape of the region. Egypt’s large population, its instable relationship 
with Israel and its being a natural gas producer were the main reasons for its selection. 
Recent natural gas discoveries in offshore Israel make examination of Israel an 
attractive and reasonable choice when doing research on Eastern Mediterranean. Since 
its creation in 1948, Israel struggled to have good relationships with other countries in 
the region. Effects of these natural gas reserves on geopolitics of the region is one of the 
reasons why Israel is examined in this chapter. Cypriot natural gas findings in its 
offshore are not much compared to the Israeli discoveries but Cyprus’s divided status 
due to Turkish invasion of northern part of the island in 1974 and the fact that Cyprus is 
a European Union member with energy resources are the reasons why it got selected to 
be included in this chapter.  
Firstly, this chapter will try to explain historical relationships of these countries 
with other countries in the region. Secondly, it will give an account of each of the 
selected countries’ natural gas capabilities. 
 
1.1 Historical Analysis 
 After the UN partition plan was announced in 1947 to find a solution to the 
Palestine question, the parties of the conflict did not accept the plan. As a result, a civil 
war broke out which caused a military intervention by several Arab states.15 Israeli 
military forces won the war and State of Israel was established within the borders of 
proposed partitioning plan. Egypt was able to retain the control of Gaza Strip and 
Jordan gained the control of Eastern Jerusalem.  
                                                          
15 “Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine”, United Nations, 29 November 1947. 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253 
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In 1957 Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to nationalize Suez Canal 
to obtain higher revenues from the canal. Britain, France and Israel objected to Nasser’s 
nationalization plan which prompted the invasion of Israel to Sinai Peninsula. Israel 
stayed in Sinai until the end of March 1957 and then withdrew its forces. Israel was able 
to defeat Egyptian forces without much hardship and it was able to gain the freedom of 
navigation in the Straits of Tiran at the end of the conflict. The defeat of the Egyptian 
forces in the conflict did not prevent Nasser from becoming a heroic figure in the eyes 
of Egyptian and Arab societies as a result of his standing up against British, French and 
Israeli forces.  
In 1967, Israel suddenly attacked Egyptian and Syrian positions as Israeli 
intelligence suggested that Egyptian attack on Israel was imminent due to Egyptian 
military mobilization in Sinai Peninsula. Israel Defence Forces were able to overcome 
Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi military forces just under six days. At the end of 
the Six-Day War, Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip and East 
Jerusalem.  
In 1973, Egypt and Syria prepared and orchestrated a coordinated attack on 
Israeli positions in Sinai and the Golan Heights. At the beginning of the Yom Kippur 
War, Egypt and Syria were able to defeat Israeli forces quite easily as Israel was not 
expecting any attack. Israeli forces were able to pushback both Egyptian and Syrian 
forces to their pre-attack positions. The Yom Kippur War ended with Israeli military 
victory. However, early military successes of Egyptian and Syrian forces in the war 
damaged the image of invincibility of the Israeli military. In 1979, Egypt and Israel 
signed a peace treaty which paved the way the normalization of the Israeli-Egyptian 
relationship. Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula after the signing of the peace 
treaty effectively gave the control of Sinai to Egypt. Also, Egyptian recognition of the 
state of Israel state prompted the Arab League to suspend Egypt’s membership. After 
the 1979 peace treaty, Egypt started to supply crude oil to Israel, flights began between 
the two countries and increased. 
Ottoman Empire had the sovereignty of Cyprus for over three centuries until it 
had to give control of the island to British Empire in 1878. The British annexed the 
island in 1914 and the Republic of Turkey recognized British sovereignty over the 
island in 1923. In 1955 intercommunal violence broke out between the two 
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communities on the island, Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Britain, Greece and Turkey 
became guarantor countries of the future state of Cyprus to ensure that Cyprus would 
not side with Turkey or Greece and to prevent the partition of the island. In 1960 
Cyprus gained independence from Britain and joined the Commonwealth of Nations in 
1961. Fearing plans to unite Cyprus with Greece, Turkey, using its guarantor status, 
intervened and invaded the northern part of the island in 1974. The Turkish military did 
not meet much resistance from Greek Cypriot forces and advanced until it controlled 
over 36% of the island. Turkish Cypriots, under the leadership of Rauf Denktaş, 
declared the establishment in 1981 of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the 
northern out of the island, which has been recognized by Turkey only.  
Cyprus signed an Association Agreement with European Economic Community 
in 1972 and applied for European Union membership in 1990. Accession talks began in 
1998 which were completed at the end of December 2002. On April 2003 Cyprus 
signed the Accession Treaty for to become a full member of the Union in May 2004. 
16The Annan Plan, a United Nations proposal to reunify the island, was put to a 
referendum on 24 April 2004. The referendum failed with 75% of the Greek Cypriots 
rejecting the plan while the 65%of Turkish Cypriots approved it. The Republic of 
Cyprus became a European Union member along with the whole island in May 2004. 
Turkey continued to hold Turkish military presence in the northern part of the island 
even after the accession of Cyprus to the EU membership. 
 
1.2 Exploration Offshore Egypt 
Egypt is the first significant case in the Mediterranean region in terms of ultra-
deep water discoveries. Shell Oil Company made the first discovery in the Nile Delta 
region’s North East Mediterranean (NEMED) block in 2003, followed by couple of 
more discoveries in the region in 2004. In 2006, ONGC Videsh Petroleum Company 
decided to drop out of NEMED block due to fears of project becoming unviable by the 
emergence of shale gas developments, particularly in United States.  
                                                          
16 European Commission Enlargement Archives. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu10/cyprus_en.htm 
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Today, Egypt’s NEMED block is estimated to have 1.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf), 
or 42 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas17. Egyptian state owned EGAS 
(Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company) launched an international bidding round for 
15 mainly onshore licenses (Gulf of Suez, Eastern and Western deserts and Sinai) in 
201118 and 15 mainly offshore licenses in the Mediterranean and Nile Delta in June 
2012.19 This was an encouragement to the rest of the East-Mediterranean countries to 
search for oil and gas reserves in their territorial zones. In 2010, United States 
Geological Survey Agency estimated that there was 122 tcf (3,455 bcm) of recoverable 
natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil in the Levant basin, south-
east Cyprus and the north-east of the NEMED block.20 
 
1.3 Exploration Offshore Israel 
Attempts for offshore explorations in Israel started in 1960’s.21First significant 
discovery was made in 1999 in Noah/Noa offshore field, followed by an additional 
reservoir discovery at “Mari-B” field in 2000.22Noble Energy (US) and Israeli 
companies Avner, Delek Drilling, Isramco and Dor made the first large offshore 
discovery in Tamar 1 site, with Tamar gas field been the greatest gas reserve discovery 
in 2009. Dalit 1 site discovery happened shortly after the discovery of Tamar 1 in 2009, 
at a 100 km distance from Israel’s northern coast. Delek has estimated that Tamar and 
Dalit fields contain 9 tcf (255 bcm) of natural gas, a quantity sufficient to meet Israel’s 
gas needs for over 20 years.23 
                                                          
17R. SuryAmurthy, “Shale lures ONGC to quit block”, The Telegraph Indıa, 20 February 2011.  
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110221/jsp/business/story_13611726.jsp 
18 “Egyptian General Petroleum Company launches International Bid Round 2011”, Deloitte. 
http://www.psg.deloitte.com/NewsLicensingRounds_EG_110927.asp 
19 “EGAS launches international oil and gas Bid Round 2012”, Deloitte. 
http://www.psg.deloitte.com/NewsLicensingRounds_EG_120607.asp 
20 “World Petroleum Resources Project, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the 
Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean, Fact Sheet 2010–2014”, U.S. Geological Survey, March 
2010. 
21Michael Gardosh, YehezkelDruckman, Binyamin Buchbinder and Michael Rybakov, “The Levant 
Basin Offshore Israel: Stratigraphy, Structure, Tectonic Evolution and Implications for 
HydrocarbonExploration”, 21 April 2008. 
22 Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, Petroleum and Natural Gas Prospecting. 
http://energy.gov.il/English/Subjects/OilAndGasExploration/Pages/GxmsMniPetroleumAndNaturalGasPr
ospecting.aspx 
 
23Delek Group, Holdings, Energy and Infrastructure,  
http://www.delek-group.com/Holdings/EnergyInfrastructure/DelekEnergy.aspx 
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The Leviathan gas field, greatest gas discovery in the history of Israel and 
region, was discovered in 2010 by a consortium comprising Noble Energy, Delek 
Drilling, Avner Oil and Ratio Oil.24 At the time Leviathan was estimated to hold 17 tcf 
(491 bcm) natural gas reserves. Other smaller discoveries include Dolphin and Tanin, 
while Pelagic, owned by Stenmetz, Sagui, Israel Opportunity and AGR Group, is 
estimated to hold 6.7 tcf (190 bcm). According to official Israeli data, Israel had 300 
bcm proven gas reserves in 2011, mostly from the Tamar field. Israel Natural Gas 
Authority director general Yehosua Stern says that this number will likely to grow to 
1300 bcm in the near future. Stern asserts, after production testing is completed in the 
Leviathan field, 300 bcm proven gas reserve figure would rise to 453 bcm and 
preliminary findings suggest the possibility of further large gas field discoveries, 
amounting to 550 bcm. 
Map 1.1: Israel’s Offshore Fields 
 
Source: LNG World News25 
In June 2013 the Netanyahu government decided to export 40% of natural gas 
reserves. Petition that was submitted to Israel’s Supreme Court to stop the export policy 
                                                          
24 Noble Energy, Operations, Eastern Mediterranean,  
http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/Operations/International/Eastern-Mediterranean-128.html 
25 LNG World News. http://www.lngworldnews.com/noble-energy-leviathan-resource-estimate-up-israel/ 
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of the Netanyahu government failed in October 2013 by a 5-2 ruling in favor of the 
government policy. Director General of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, 
Shaul Tzemach, submitted export recommendations to Prime Minister. 
Recommendation list sets a number of export conditions for Israeli natural gas, such as 
export quota would be determined according to maximum daily production limit for 
export purposes, licenses would be granted for a period of 25 years and Petroleum 
Commissioner would further examine license applicants to determine whether granting 
such licenses would contribute to the development of the energy market, increase 
energy competition, ensure energy security, maximize economic benefits, public 
security and interest. As export option is decided with Israel’s Supreme Court ruling in 
October 2013, with Leviathan and Tamar fields, Israel would become a major energy 
player in the Middle East. 
 
1.4 Exploration Offshore Cyprus 
Explorations for hydrocarbons in Cyprus started in 2006 in an exploration area 
of 51,000 sq km offshore, which was divided into 13 blocks, that is a part of the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) proclaimed by the Republic of Cyprus.26 This was 
followed by two new Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delineation agreements -there 
was already one with Egypt, signed in 2003- with Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010 -
first exploratory drilling began on 2011).  
When RoC announced its first international tender for three-year oil and gas 
exploration licenses, there were only three bids and Noble Energy was the only 
company. The natural gas discovery in Cyprus Block 12 has estimated gross mean 
resources of 7 trillion cubic feet exploration Offshore Cyprus.27 The discovery well 
encountered 310 feet of net natural gas pay. The Block 12 field covers approximately 40 
square miles and will require additional appraisal drilling.28 Delek, Noble’s partner in 
Aphrodite field, estimated the reserves a little lower 5.2 tcf’ (147 bcm) as Delek is a 
                                                          
26 Ministry of Energy, Cyprus, Hydrocarbon Exploration, 2012. 
http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/dmlhexploration_en/dmlhexploration_en?OpenDocument 
27 Noble Energy, Operations, Eastern Mediterranean. 
http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/Exploration/Recent-Discoveries-130.html 
28 Ibid. 
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company listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange it is obliged to use different methods 
for estimation. 
Map 1.2: Offshore Cyprus Hydrocarbons Exploration Blocks 
      
Source: Deloitte.29 
Significant discoveries in the Israeli Leviathan block had also become an 
encouragement for the companies for their bids in the second licensing rounds on 
Cyprus block 12, launched on 11 Feburary. Protests from Turkey did not stop the 15 
bidders consisted of individual companies and consortia, and also a handful of oil and 
large gas companies like Total of France, Eni of Italy, Gasprombank of Russia, Petronas 
of Malaysia and Kogas of South Korea. Primary interest was in block 9, adjacent to 
block 12 and block 2, adjacent to block 9. The successful bidders for blocks 2, 3, 9 and 
11 were announced at the end of October 2012. ENI and Kogas were initially invited to 
negotiate a contract for blocks 2 and 3. Total and Novatek for block 9, and Total by 
itself for Block 11. Talks with Total and Novatek over Block 9 were subsequently 
terminated and the government started negotiations for that block with the ENI-Kogas 
consortium instead. At the same time, it started talks with Total for Block 10 with Total 
alone.30 
                                                          
29 The Republic of Cyprus opens International Bid Round for twelve offshore blocks, Deloitte. 
http://www.psg.deloitte.com/NewsLicensingRounds_CY_120208.asp 
30 Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen and Harry Tzimitras, Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and 
Future Scenarios, Prio Report, 2013. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
There are several options of which some are listed and examined in the 
subsection of the introduction of this thesis. Academicians and policy makers consider 
these options with respect to when it comes to how to use Eastern Mediterranean energy 
reserves. All the options listed here give considerable benefits to regional countries. 
Also, disadvantages associated with any single option are also discussed below. 
Regional countries are actively considering these options but these options too, may not 
remain valid for long because of the fast changing geopolitical landscape and newly 
developed technologies. All of this reflects the dynamic nature of the geopolitics of 
energy.  
This chapter examines six possible scenarios that Israel and Cyprus choose to 
pursue for their natural gas reserves. Each scenario tries to answer questions of whether 
an option is economically feasible, whether it is politically feasible in terms of 
agreement among the countries, whether it can play a role in developing cooperation 
and a peace-building measure. All scenarios examined in this chapter bear potential 
benefits and risks for the Israel and Cyprus. An economically viable scenario may not 
be politically viable for a country. Also, in order to use gas as a conflict resolution tool, 
countries can choose to disregard economic and political aspects. To understand where 
the current geopolitics of the region is headed, examination of this scenarios is crucial. 
Some of the scenarios include pipeline projects involving countries such as Egypt, 
Turkey and Greece. Some others involve LNG and Floating LNG facilities to export 
Eastern Mediterranean gas. 
 
2.1. Scenario I: Arish-Ashkelon 
Arish-Ashkelon pipeline project came to realization when Egypt and Israel 
agreed in 2005 to supply Egyptian natural gas to Israel Electric Corporation. Israeli 
Minister of Infrastructure Benjamin Ben-Eliezer and Egyptian Minister of Petroleum 
Sameh Fahmy signed the agreement, which had a 15 year life span with an option to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.prio.no/Global/upload/Cyprus/Publications/Hydrocarbons_Report-ENG.pdf 
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renew it. 31According to the agreement, 100 km pipeline with a total capacity of 9 bcm a 
year would be built under the sea connecting Ashkelon to Arish. East Mediterranean 
Gas Company, which is a consortium of Mediterranean Gas Pipeline Ltd, Israeli 
Merhay, PTT and others, had taken the construction and operation obligations.32 
Construction of submerged pipelines estimated to have cost $469 m.33 In February 
2008, Egypt started to supply natural gas through the pipeline occurring to the initial 
agreement of 1.7 bcm annually to Israel.34 Later on, this figure increased to 2.1 bcm a 
year, which corresponded to 40% of Israel’s natural gas needs in 2009.  
Egyptian activists who were concerned about the 2005 deal, tried to find a legal 
case against the project by claiming Egypt was selling its natural gas below the world 
gas prices. In November 2008, Egyptian court had overruled the agreement between 
Egypt and Israel by siding with the lawyer Ibrahim Yousri, who appealed to the court 
by claiming the Egypt was losing $9m a day due to fixed-price sale to Israel.35 
However, this ruling did not have any effect on Egypt’s natural gas deliveries as 
Egyptian government did not change its policy to supply gas to Israel. Mubarak’s 
downfall in Egyptian revolution in 25 January 2011 marked an important point in the 
project’s survival as gas deliveries became problematic due to bombings several times 
of pipelines in Sinai, which halted the deliveries for long periods of time.36 On April 
2012, EGAS canceled the natural gas agreement with Israel, claiming Israel was months 
late in its payments. President of the state-owned company, EGAS, said cancellation of 
the project was purely done for economic considerations and Israeli Prime Minister 
                                                          
31Shlomi Eldar, “Israel's Miscalculation on Egyptian Natural Gas”, Al-Monitor, 12 September 12 2013. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/israel-ariel-sharon-palestinians-egyptian-natural-
gas.html 
32 “PTT buys 25% of East Mediterranean Gas Co.”, Oil & Gas Journal, 7 December 2007. 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/2007/12/ptt-buys-25-of-east-mediterranean-gas-co.html 
33 Jodi Sanger-Weaver, “Egypt- Israel, And The Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline Controversy”, Prospect, 24 
January 2012. 
http://prospectjournal.org/2012/01/24/egypt-israel-and-the-arish-ashkelon-pipeline-controversy/ 
34 Nassir Shirkhani, “Egyptian gas flows to Israel”, Upstream, 10 March 2008.  
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article1153755.ece 
35 “Egypt court freezes Israel gas deal”, Al Jazeera, 18 November 2008. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/11/2008111895917929279.html 
36Stratfor, “Egypt's Dilemma After Israel Attacks”, Business Insider, 19 August 2011.  
http://www.businessinsider.com/egypts-hamas-dilemma-after-attacks-in-israel-2011-8 
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Benjamin Netanyahu also said cancellation of the natural gas agreement was not 
politically motivated.37 
Map 2.1: Arish-Ashkelon, Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) 
 
Source: Hydrocarbons-technology38 
Egypt has a growing population with a yearly growth rate of 1.7%.39 Domestic 
natural gas consumption in Egypt is also rising, with a 10% rate annually over the past 3 
years.40 In 2012, domestic gas consumption in Egypt was 55 billion cubic meters while 
it produced only 60 billion cubic meters.41 As the consumption rate increased to the 
                                                          
37Edmund Sanders, “Egypt-Israel natural gas deal revoked for economic reasons”, Los Angeles Times, 23 
April 2012. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/23/world/la-fg-egypt-israel-oil-20120424 
38Arish-Ashkelon,Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), Hydrocarbons-technology.  
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/arab-gas-pipeline-agp/arab-gas-pipeline-agp1.html 
39 World Bank, “Population growth (annual %)”. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW 
40 Daria Solovieva , “Why Is Egypt Importing Natural Gas?”, Egypt Oil & Gas, 2013. 
http://www.egyptoil-gas.com/read_article_issues.php?AID=623 
41 Nadine Marroushi, “Egypt: natural gas in abundance but every day brings power cuts”, Financial 
Times, 18 December 2013. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5aabd292-52c1-11e3-8586-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2pqOT0tiZ 
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level of the production rate, Egyptian Petroleum Ministry announced on 17 December 
2012 that Egypt had become a gas importing country.42 
In order to compensate its gas deficit Egypt needed to buy some portion of its 
natural gas needs from abroad. One of the less costly options for Egyptians is to get 
newly discovered Israeli natural gas through the already established Arish-Ashkhelon 
pipeline. Through technological and mechanical modifications to the pipeline, 
Leviathan gas can be supplied to Egypt. Arish-Ashkhelon pipeline was bombed dozens 
of times in the past, which makes this option a risky choice for both countries. In 
addition, Israel would not enter a project if its possible material benefits do not 
outperform the possible costs and the risks. 
For Egypt, Arish-Ashkhelon pipeline would not be a suitable option due to 
pipeline security reasons. Pipelines that connect Israel and Jordan to Egypt are situated 
at the Sinai Peninsula and Egypt was unable to secure the region from terrorist attacks 
since the ousting of Hosni Mubarak.43Egypt needs a stable natural gas supply to meet its 
growing domestic gas demand, and therefore, without any political considerations to be 
made, security of Sinai Peninsula needs to be established before the any talk of Israeli 
natural gas supply through Arish-Ashkhelon pipeline. 
As it is an already established pipeline, connected with LNG terminals Damieta 
and Idku at the end of the route, there won’t be any additional costs of construction. The 
option proposed change of direction of flow in the pipeline by an engineering alteration, 
which would need a small budget. So, it can be clearly said that Arish-Ashkelon 
Pipeline Scenario is economically feasible. The scenario is politically a challenge in 
terms of agreement between the countries. It includes risks of repercussions on domestic 
politics for both the Israeli and Egyptian politicians, considering the troubled past of the 
relationship between the two countries and the current political turmoil on the region.  
Another important fact that aggravates the solution in political terms is the 
fragile environment that escalated after the Egyptian Revolution. It is true that political 
agreement within the countries is challenging, yet it is too early to say that the scenario 
                                                          
42 Al-Masry Al-Youm, “Egypt officially becomes gas-importing country to meet demand”, Egypt 
Independent, 19 December 2012. 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-officially-becomes-gas-importing-country-meet-demand 
43 “Blast hits gas pipeline between Egypt, Jordan”, Reuters, 6 July 2013. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/07/us-egypt-protests-pipeline-idUSBRE96601I20130707 
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is not feasible in political terms. The political and economic conditions of the Arish-
Ashkelon Pipeline Scenario, as stated above, will be the core elements in determining 
the role that it will play in terms of developing cooperation between Israel and Egypt. 
As these conditions, especially political situation is still unclear, it is not possible to 
make an estimation in terms of conflict resolution or cooperation in developing full 
implications of this scenario. 
 
2.2. Scenario II: Peace 
Recent natural gas discoveries in the East Mediterranean Sea changed the 
already complicated regional dynamics further into a more complex one as littoral 
countries started to claim and publicly announce their clashing interests with one 
another.44 Israel announced that, with Cyprus, they would co-develop fields in the 
territorial waters of Cyprus. Turkey sent warships into the area objecting to the deal 
Cyprus had made with Israel, claiming the northern part of the island was not a part in 
the negotiations.45  
This move presents us a dark image of the region’s future. Although natural gas 
reserves became another source of conflict in an already conflicted part of the world, 
reserves can also serve the littoral countries as a tool to help create peace in the long 
term. This scenario looks at three neighbors of Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine, 
and tries to examine the possibility of using natural gas as a tool for conflict resolution. 
Economic viability of options generally did not get much focus in here as this scenario’s 
main aim is not economic benefits but the establishment of peace-building measures. 
Thus, economic and political calculations were given second place, whereas peace-
building and conflict resolution dimensions were given the main importance in the 
following country subsections.    
 
 
                                                          
44 “Gas Finds Complicate Eastern Mediterranean Security”, International Relations and Security Network, 
26 June 2013. 
http://isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=165423 
45Anshel Pfeffer, “Turkey to deploy warships over gas dispute with Cyprus”, Haaretz, 25 September 
2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/turkey-to-deploy-warships-over-gas-dispute-
with-cyprus-1.386659 
25 
 
Map 2.2: The Republic of Cyprus EEZ delimitations and hydrocarbon research blocks 
and Turkey's continental shelf claims 
 
Source: International Crisis Group46 
2.2.1. Palestine: 
Israeli natural gas can be used as a confidence-building tool in negotiations with 
Palestinians. However, confidence-building measures would be best used when some 
peace framework was already in place, such as established communication channels 
which would provide information on the activities of relevant parties.47 Also, sharing 
natural gas resources with Palestinians for peace purposes would be a politically risky 
move. Nationalistic reactions would prevent any such attempt, so decision makers 
would need to carefully craft such a scheme. 
British Gas Company found a large natural gas reservoir in 2000, named Gaza 
Marine, 32 km west of Gaza Strip inside of Gaza territorial waters.48 Back then Ariel 
Sharon government did not put its support behind the project due its lack of trust in 
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Palestinians with regard to on how they would handle the wealth they would receive.49 
Sharon saw Egyptians as a more reliable and trustworthy business partner than 
Palestinians and signed a natural gas agreement with Egypt in 2005.50  British Gas 
continued to lobby to develop the fields.51 
By putting support behind the Gaza Marine project, development of the Gaza 
Marine fields’ 30 bcm reservoirs can help Israel to release some of the pressure it had 
endured over the years.52If also a decision is made to develop Gaza Marine, estimated 
cost would be$2.5 billion.53 Development of these fields can become a precursor of 
future energy cooperation with Palestinians, which would help to achieve a long lasting 
solution to Palestine question. 
Map 2.3: Overlap of maritime border claims by Israel and Lebanon 
 
Source: Natural Gas Europe.54 
2.2.2. Lebanon: 
Lebanon’s territorial claims in East-Mediterranean Sea are troubling for 
Israelis.55 But, if the political climate becomes suitable for both sides to reach an 
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understanding in sharing natural gas reserves, this would have greater regional effects. 
However, chances of Lebanon accepting any Israeli offer or vice versa on natural gas 
reserves are quite dim. Israelis would not want to share natural gas reserves in which 
they have already invested politically and economically.56 Also, Hezbollah in Lebanon 
would not accept any agreement that would potentially share Lebanese natural gas with 
Israel.57 
2.2.3. Egypt: 
For quite some time Israel was getting a portion of its natural gas needs from 
Egyptian supplies. In 2005, the two sides agreed on Egyptian natural gas supply to 
Israel for over 20 years, annually 7 bcm. Problems with Egyptian-Israeli pipeline made 
Egyptian gas unreliable for Israelis. Until the disruption of the natural gas deal in 2012 
by Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company, the pipeline between Egypt and Israel was 
bombed over 15 times, which negatively affected the natural gas prices in Israel due to 
supply shortages.58 
Since 2012, decision makers in Egypt have not been in favor of exporting their 
natural gas to Israel. There are two reasons for this Egyptian behavior. Firstly, due to 
ousting of Mubarak and the political instability that came with it, decision to export 
natural gas to Israel would take a toll on the Political of Egyptian leadership. Secondly, 
for decades, the Egyptian population graphic portrayed a stable growth.59 Population 
increase in Egypt also would increase Egypt’s energy consumption levels in upcoming 
years. Israel can supply natural gas to Egypt by an already existing pipeline between 
two countries. Also, not only this exchange would ensure two sides that they have more 
to gain if both cooperated in energy fields, but also their cooperation would give more 
tools for achieving peace in Levant region.  
Egyptian politics has evolved away from its authoritarian tradition, thus, 
domestic political calculations in both countries increases the unlikelihood of this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Israel-irritated-at-UN-for-nodding-at-Lebanese-gas-claims 
56Yahya Dbouk , “Israel Accuses Lebanon of Stealing Its Gas and Oil”, Al-Akhbar English, 3 October 
2013. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17222 
57 “Hezbollah: Lebanon will not let Israel seize its natural gas”, Haaretz, 14 July 2011. 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hezbollah-lebanon-will-not-let-israel-seize-its-natural-
gas-1.373201 
58Gabe Khan, “Egyptian Gas Stoppage to Cost Israel $1.5m Per Day”, Arutz Sheva, 28 April 2011. 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/143760#.Us3fprTJa4k 
59 World Bank, “Population growth (annual %)”,  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW 
28 
 
option. However, when regional dynamics change into a more favorable atmosphere, 
Israeli natural gas exports would be a positive development for security and stability for 
the region. 
 
2.3. Scenario III: Turkey 
One of the export options that Israeli political establishment thinking seriously 
about is building a pipeline to Turkey. Relationship between two countries has been 
shaken by a series of events over the past years. Israel launched a military operation on 
Gaza in 2009 when Turkey was acting as a negotiator between Israel and Syria. In 2009, 
referring to the military operation of Israel in Gaza, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan 
stormed out of a Davos panel with words directed at Israeli President Peres “When it 
comes to killing, you know well how to kill”.60 Gaza Flotilla that aimed to break the 
Israeli blockage of Gaza Strip and bring aid to the city was stopped by the Israeli Navy 
on 31 May 2010. The Turkish Mavi Marmara ship was raided by Israeli Navy 
personnel, who killed nine Turkish citizens. The Mavi Marmara incident put a complete 
freeze to an already unstable Turkish-Israeli relationship.  
In 1990’s two countries enjoyed cooperation on military equipment and 
intelligence sharing.61 Their alliance considered to be “anchor of stability in a changing 
region” by U.S. senior officials.62Over the years, unaffected by the stormy relationship 
two sides had, Turkey and Israel’s total trade volume has continuously increased, 
reaching $4 billion in 2012.63 In March 2013, Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized for 
the Mavi Marmara affair and announced that Israel was ready to compensate to families 
for the losses.64 Still, even if the rapprochement process takes time to heal a deeply 
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damaged relationship, it is probable that the two sides can come to an understanding on 
energy issues, such as the proposed pipeline project. 
Map 2.4: Routes of TAP and TANAP pipelines 
 
Source: Trans Adriatic Pipeline65 
According to a study done by the Turkish energy company Turcas, for a distance 
of 470 km, ranging from Israel to Turkey, $2.5 billion will be required to construct a 
pipeline under the sea.66 This cost estimate was made on the basis of two 8 bcm 
capacity pipelines to be placed side by side. Pipelines would be constructed from the 
Leviathan reserves to either Ceyhan or Mersin in Turkey. The Ceyhan option seems to 
be more suitable option as it would be more efficient to connect pipelines to Anatolian 
natural gas corridor. For a 40 km pipeline, this would additionally increase the cost of 
the project by an $83 million.67 Another $647 million would be required to build a 
connection between Ceyhan and TANAP (Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) for the 
Leviathan gas to reach Europe. If the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), is to be chosen 
instead of TANAP, 1,215 km of pipelines would be needed be to built from Ceyhan to 
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Turkey-Greece border with a cost of $1.93 billion. For the Leviathan gas to reach 
European markets, if the TANAP option is chosen, the total project would cost an 
estimated $3.12 billion.68 TAP option would increase the estimated cost of the project to 
$4.4 billion. 
To reach European markets, the Turkey scenario is the most commercially 
attractive option for Israel. Other options, such as Floating LNG, LNG platform in 
Vassilikos or Eastern-Mediterranean pipeline project does not give the same economic 
efficiency as Turkey option. However, the relationship between Israel and Turkey still 
remains problematic even if some steps have been taken to ease it up. The current 
government in Turkey would not want to enter any visible economic relationship with 
Israel in the near future due to Turkey having three elections in 2014-2015. Also, after 
the Egyptian revolution and energy cost spikes in Israel due to problems in the Egyptian 
natural gas pipeline, Israel is more careful not to rely on third countries for its energy 
dealings. 
Building a pipeline to Turkey is one of the few feasible options in terms of 
economic viability, and maybe the best one in terms of reaching the European market. 
Looking at all the cost calculations stated above, it can be said that this scenario is 
economically feasible. On the other hand, it does not seem politically possible in terms 
of an agreement between the countries due to the turbulent and dynamic relationship. 
Progression in terms of policy coordination in trade and military deals and diplomatic 
initiatives especially in international arena cannot be undermined. However, due the 
fragile relationship between the parties, which is a result of the various political disputes 
in the past, reconciliation is not foreseeable in the near future, at least to facilitate such a 
territorial and cooperation. 
 
2.4 Scenario IV: Floating LNG Facility 
 One of the alternative solutions for this dispute is to set up a Floating Liquefied 
Gas Facility (FLNG) to process and transport the gas. Floating liquefied natural gas 
(FLNG) refers to water-based liquefied natural gas (LNG) operations employing 
technologies designed to enable the development of offshore natural gas resources. 
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Israel may set up this FLNG installation off the Mediterranean coast, beginning with the 
Tamar FLNG project, followed by the beginning of operations by 2017. The FLNG 
facility would draw on volumes from the nearby Tamar and Dalit fields and be able to 
export up to 3 million tons per year (144 Bcf per year). This option is likely to cost 
around $5 billion. 
The first development of FLNG was initiated by Shell with the Au$12bn Prelude 
Project, which covers 200 kilometers (120 mi) offshore Western Australia. Royal Dutch 
Shell made their investment decision public on 20 May 2011 and initiated the 
construction in October 2012. In theory, the FLNG will produce, liquefy, store and 
transfer LNG (and potentially LPG and condensate) at sea before carriers ship it directly 
to markets. 
Although it seems feasible and innovative, there are several challenges for this 
floating liquefied natural gas facility. In terms of the design and construction of the 
FLNG facility, every element of a conventional LNG facility needs to fit into an area 
roughly one quarter the size, whilst maintaining the utmost levels of safety and giving 
increased flexibility to LNG production.69Wave motion is also an important challenge 
once the facility starts operating. Due to harsh weather conditions in open seas, LNG 
containment systems must have good resistive measures to withstand sea waves and 
storms, which ultimately affect the stability of LNG tanks. Possible solutions for 
reducing the effect of weather and motion should be found in designs that must be 
capable of withstanding and reducing the impact of waves. 
Despite the challenges, the project is still appealing due to substantial 
advantages. FLNG technology is environmentally advantageous. First, natural gas is 
one of the cleanest-burning fossil fuel. Moreover, natural gas is abundant and 
affordable, and may have the capacity to respond the need for world energy through 
realization of the potential of otherwise unviable gas reserves.  
Because the facility is operated in the sea, constructing pipelines on the shores is 
not necessary. As Shell Australia Chairman Ann Pickard stated during the construction 
process of Prelude FLNG facility, developing a floating LNG technology reduces the 
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project’s cost and environmental footprint as it removes the need for offshore platforms, 
long pipelines to shore, near shore works such as dredging and jetty construction, and 
onshore development such as building roads, lay down areas and accommodation 
facilities.70 As there will be no construction or deconstruction of the facilities, there will 
not be any possible harm to marine and costal environments. Also, in times of need, the 
facility can easily be disconnected and removed, before being refurbished and re-
deployed elsewhere. While one of the main concerns of LNG facilities is the high cost 
of pumping the gas to shore, FLNG is a more feasible option in this case. In addition, 
this may set an example for new business prospects for countries to build FLNG 
facilities for fields that would otherwise remain disconnected and unreachable, such as 
those off the coast of East Africa up to the present day. 
The FLNG facility will be moored directly above the natural gas field, it will 
route gas from the field to the facility via risers. When the gas reaches the facility, it 
will be processed to produce natural gas, LPG, and natural gas condensate. The 
processed feed gas will be treated to remove impurities, and liquefied through freezing, 
before being stored in the hull. Ocean-going carriers will offload the LNG, as well as 
the other liquid by-products, for delivery to markets worldwide. The conventional 
alternative to this would be to pump gas through pipelines to a shore-based facility for 
liquefaction, before transferring gas for delivery.71 
In the case of Israel, a Floating LNG facility may be positioned over the 
producing field, and tankers being loaded would be positioned alongside it. As 
mentioned above, an FLNG facility will be cheaper, as it reduces the need for expensive 
and complex undersea pipelines. As the facility is not stable, its position can be changed 
between the fields. Noble Energy is evaluating FLNG for the Tamar field, envisioning a 
capacity of 3.4 million tons per annum (mtpa) and a target start-up in 2018.72 
Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) signed an agreement 
with Noble Energy led consortium for to do a feasibility study of constructing a floating 
                                                          
70 “Australia: Shell Prelude LNG Project gets Federal Approval”, The Global Herald, 15 November 2010. 
http://theglobalherald.com/australia-shell-prelude-lng-project-gets-federal-approval/7000/ 
71 “A revolution in natural gas production”, Shell. 
http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/major-projects-2/prelude-flng/revolution-natural-gas-
production.html 
72 Simon Henderson, “Natural Gas Exports For Israel and Cyprus”, German Marshall Fund, 
2013.http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Henderson20130901-
NaturalGasExportOptions.pdf 
33 
 
LNG platform. Russian state owned Gazprom Company also signed a non-binding letter 
of intent with DSME to purchase LNG from the FLNG platform when the project 
successfully reaches to completion. By being the first vessel that will be completed and 
being operationalized offshore Australia; FLNG continues to push the technological 
boundaries. In order to be a strategic partner of Leviathan's investment, the Australian 
company Woodside Petroleum initiated negotiations with Noble Energy and its Israeli 
partners.  
Despite the advantages, there are several disadvantages to this option. Floating 
LNG facility is a big installation, which will always be vulnerable to attack by anti-ship 
missiles or even rocket-propelled grenades. Current turmoil in Syria exposed many 
weapons to non-state actors which can potentially be used to launch terror attacks on 
FLNG. Also, most countries in the region have large amounts of missile arsenal as their 
disposal, giving them the capability to make threats or even act on such threats.  On the 
other hand, industry experts play down the security risk and predict that the 
attractiveness of FLNG, not only in the Eastern Mediterranean but also other parts of 
the world, will lead to breakthroughs in technology, cost constraints and commercial 
viability.73 
 
2.5. Scenario V: Eastern-Mediterranean Pipeline Project 
European Commission’s approval of East-Med Pipeline project as a Project of 
Common Interest (PCI) surfaced once again probability of realization of the 
project.74Several EU criteria met by the East Med pipeline can be listed as follows: the 
pipeline facilitates access to sources of supply that regarding diversification of sources, 
counterparts, and routes and hence contributes to competition inter alia. Moreover, it 
encourages market integration and interoperability through connecting Cyprus to the 
EU mainland. The pipeline has a potential influence on security of supply beyond 
Cyprus and Greece to Bulgaria, Italy and the SEE. Beside the already existing route via 
Turkey, the pipeline constructs a new one for Caspian gas, which makes it meet the 
Europe’s necessary criteria for alternative routes. Keeping in mind the Russia-Ukraine 
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crisis that occurred in 2009, which also disrupted supplies transported through Turkey, 
the significance of this cannot be overemphasized.  Regarding the reverse-flow 
infrastructure of the East Med, it might enable provision of supplies from Italy and 
North Africa towards the southeast. 
The technical feasibility of the project is indicated by studies. Although the 
maximum water depth of 2,873 m constitutes a challenge, required engineering is 
similar to already completed projects such as the planned Galsi and Medgaz. While the 
approach to Crete is considered complex because of the rough see bed, it still does not 
cause insurmountable problems and the project already defines a marine survey scope.  
Map 2.5: Eastern-Mediterranean Pipeline Project 
 
Source: Interfax Energy75 
It is known that it is expensive to establish a major energy infrastructure. The 
EU estimates that to cover gas needs from 2010 to 2020, investments of €70bn are 
required; this sum includes import pipelines, interconnectors, reverse flow, storage, and 
LNG.76 This total covers import pipelines, interconnectors, reverse flow, storage, and 
LNG. As expected, one of the criteria for PCI status requires project’s overall benefits 
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to exceed its costs. Generating a new corridor from the Eastern Mediterranean to 
Europe is more costly regardless of the choice between LNG and a pipeline. The East 
Med’s costs (from source to Italy) are estimated at €6bn and would be realized with 
Project financing probably consisting of 70 per cent debt and 30 per cent equity.77As 
potential sources for facilitating financing, European institutions have increasingly 
focused on energy, with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
having contributed around €8bn since 1991 and the European Investment Bank more 
than €55bn since 2000 (27 per cent on gas).78 
Furthermore, as part of PCI the provisions of Regulation 347/2013, which was 
mainly designed to encourage investment, would facilitate the East Med’s development, 
through focusing on obstacles with respect to regulatory issues, granting of permits, and 
financing. It provides several advantages to increase investment, which can be argued as 
following: “preferential treatment for PCI’s, streamlined permit procedures, a clear 
regulatory framework, long-term incentives for investments including the obligation on 
national regulatory authorities to grant risk-related incentives through tariffs 
(anticipatory investments, early recognition of costs incurred, additional return, etc.), 
and appropriate cost allocation to enable investments with cross-border impact.”79 
Moreover, as part of PCI the East Med possesses eligibility for financial support, 
including grants for studies and financial instruments from CEF (Connecting Europe 
Facility). Even though the Commission’s initial proposal of €41.2bn for CEF has 
decreased to almost €30bn, where €5,126 million directly goes to the energy sector, the 
instruments will help projects leveraging more private investments.80 Especially 
important for investors, though, the analysis indicates that the East Med would provide 
competitive tariffs that are lower than the tariffs of an LNG plant. Hence this makes the 
project less prohibitive than has been considered. For instance, in case of exports to 
Italy and SEE, the costs associated with LNG would be three times of the pipeline’s 
average transportation tariffs. While the tariff of LNG to Italy and SEE would change 
between 54% and 100%, the corresponding pipeline tariff to Italy via Greece would 
range between 43% and 51%. Actually, this can be compared to the transportation of 
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gas from the Caspian to Europe via Turkey and Greece, considering the range of their 
tariffs that change between 31% and 68%.81 
According to calculations stated above, Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline Scenario 
is not feasible in economic terms, even though it is a Project of Common Interest 
approved by European Commission. In contrast, it is considered as politically feasible, 
and the project’s approval by European Commission as a PCI is an indicator of it. The 
project is actually not playing a role in terms of playing an active role of developing 
cooperation, as there is already cooperation and the project is positioned according to 
and by the help of it. 
 
2.6 Scenario VI: Vassilikos LNG Terminal 
 Vassilikos option entertained by Israel and Cyprus will jointly operate an LNG 
plant that would serve as their natural gas to enter to a liquefaction process. The facility 
will also enable the parties to export the gas by ship to Greece for regasification. The 
Project is supported by Cypriot government and Noble energy, although there exists 
series of weaknesses as well as the strengths. 
A memorandum of understanding had been signed between Total and the 
Cypriot government to build a LNG facility in Vasilikos. According to this agreement 
the construction of LNG trains is expected to start in 2016. Total also had the 
exploration license for blocks 10 and 11 of Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone, in 
February 2013. On June 2013, to plan LNG facility in the Cyprus, American Noble 
Energy signed a memorandum of understanding with Israeli Delak and Avnar. Italy’s 
ENI and South Korea’s Kogas have respectively %80 and % 20 interests in Blocks 2, 3 
and 9 of the island’s EEZ. During a meeting with the President of Cyprus Nicos 
Anastasiades, ENI’s CEO Paolo Scaroni revealed the Italian company’s interest in 
eventually participating in the LNG Project should its exploration activities off the 
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shores of the island prove to be successful.82 ENI plans to start the exploratory drilling 
in 2014.83 
A press release had been made by Noble Energy on 3 October 2013, which 
mentions that one appraisal well drilled at Block 12, offshore Cyprus has encountered 
approximately 120 feet of net natural gas. According to Noble Energy Vice President 
Keith Elliott, Cyprus A-2 field showed substantial amounts of recoverable natural gas 
and further appraisal activities would be needed to discover other Cyprus gas fields. 84 
In the Mediterranean region, several LNG regasification terminals can serve as 
entry points to Europe. This option would allow the Eastern Mediterranean LNG to 
avoid being restricted to a particular market. On the other hand, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) considers building a Cyprus LNG facility as a valid investment 
option. The Bank has already raised a loan worth of €130million for reconstructing the 
power station exploded in July 2011 at Vasilikos area.85 
This kind of an LNG facility will able the Cyprus to be flexible enough in terms 
of monetization of its funds by reaching European and Asian markets, it should be 
mentioned that any agreements signed between the government and the companies 
regarding the building of the facility are not binding. Cyprus’ EU membership is a great 
advantage to the island for entering the gas market, but the discovery of additional 
amounts of natural gas is essential for the justification of the economic feasibility of the 
project. 
Given the field proximity of Leviathan to the Aphrodite field, a joint LNG plant 
at Vassilikos looks like the most sensible option in economic terms. Besides, it seems to 
be the only realistic and viable option for EU to receive Israeli and Cypriot natural gas. 
Moreover, the Cyprus National Hydrocarbons Company (CNHC) stated that they 
consider the LNG plant at Vassilikos as the only viable economic solution to Cyprus’ 
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gas exports. Involved in other significant discoveries beside Aphrodite in the Cypriot 
EEZ, the CNHC also claims that this project has the best destination for Israeli gas as 
well as the Lebanese gas that has not discovered yet. 
The commercial viability arguments are based on decreasing cost of a facility 
with increasing number of trains. Accordingly, establishing a regional LNG hub at 
Vassilikos with one train facility would cost $6 billion, in addition to a $3 billion of 
infrastructure cost. Whereas expanding it to a two-train facility would only add $3 
billion to the budget, which increase total expenditure to $12 million. A three-train 
facility would only cost $15 billion with respect to similar calculations. 86 
Figure 1.1: Projected LNG demand by region through 2020 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Agency, BP, Facts 
Global Energy; A.T. Kearney analysis87 
However, the size of the area in Vassilikos is only about 2 sq. km. Hence, there 
are various questions raised by industry sources about the adequacy of the space for a 
modern-sized export plant of at least three trains of 5 million tons/yt of LNG each in the 
area.88Besides, there is even a more relevant weakness of the project. Considering the 
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vitality of what will be substantial state revenues for Israel, their concerns regarding 
controlling the revenues from exports. In addition, there are potential security risks that 
might put Cyprus in a situation of higher political tensions with Turkey. Additionally, 
the military point of view clearly indicates that Israeli generals necessarily perceive the 
export facility as a matter of Israeli sovereignty.   
However, these plans require discovering more fields and a significant shift in 
Israel’s policy on sending its gas for processing to a third country. By the scenario 
where Vassilikos become an LNG hub in the Eastern Mediterranean region, which takes 
in gas from Israeli and Lebanese fields, the exports might rise to 50 bcm per year.89 
Cypriot officials’ optimistic predictions indicate that an LNG plant could be exporting 7 
bcm by 2020, while exports will reach to 35 bcm by 2025.90 The plans to deliver gas to 
Vassilikos from offshore Lebanon by 2020 are not to be considered viable yet. 
Furthermore, in port cities such as Ashdod, Ashkelon and Eilat, there are 
opposition voices raised against domestic LNG export plans.91 Hence, a joint plant built 
in Vassilikos would help Israel to bypass this opposition. In addition, this option would 
benefit Israel in terms of preferential import with other EU countries, beside EU grants. 
Cyprus and Israel enjoy a good relationship which should help two sides to agree on a 
roadmap. Regarding all, this project is the monetization option that seems most likely to 
be actualized. Nevertheless, the project’s commercial viability is dependent upon 
delivering additional Israeli gas to Vassilikos. 92 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.cysha.org.cy/gr/News/20130524/Final_CY_HCSafety_cpe.pdf 
89 Simon Henderson, “Natural Gas Exports For Israel and Cyprus”, German Marshall Fund, 2013. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Henderson20130901-
NaturalGasExportOptions.pdf 
90Ibid. 
91Yifa Yaakov, “High Court gives green light to gas export”, The Times of Israel, 21 October 2013. 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-gives-green-light-to-gas-export/ 
92 Simon Henderson, “Natural Gas Exports For Israel and Cyprus”, German Marshall Fund, 2013. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries in the offshores of Israel and 
Cyprus is a new development that needs a further analysis with every new development. 
This thesis attempted to explore possible answers to the question of how these natural 
gas discoveries affect the region’s geopolitics. Two regional countries, Israel and 
Cyprus, were the main focus of this study. By focusing on these two countries and 
examining their possible policy decisions, the thesis tried to explain the effects of 
natural gas reserves on geopolitics. As Israel has the most natural gas reserves in the 
region, compared to Cyprus, it was assumed that Israeli policy decisions on how to use 
natural gas reserves in Leviathan and Tamar fields will be more dramatic and decisive 
when geopolitics taken into consideration. However, importance of Cypriot natural gas 
reserves has taken enough attention even if the Israel has most of the gas in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Cyprus’s history with Turkey, its divided status since 1974 and Cyprus 
being a European Union member makes Cypriot natural gas discoveries an important 
factor that affects regional politics. 
 Some of the natural gas scenarios for Israel and Cyprus discovered in Chapter 
Two are economically feasible but realization of these scenarios are problematic due to 
political realities of the region. Nevertheless, even if the political realities or economic 
feasibility of the scenario look negative, viability of a scenario can still exist if it can be 
a part of conflict resolution process. Arish-Ashkelon scenario is a cheap option which 
involves only some mechanical engineering on the pipeline to reverse the flow of 
natural gas from Israel to Egypt. However, politically this is a hard scenario to 
implement for both the Israeli and Egyptian politicians due to risk of repercussions on 
domestic politics on both countries, especially for Egyptian politicians after the 
Egyptian Revolution.  
Peace scenario is not an economically interesting option for Israel but it is a 
beneficial option to use resolving conflicts with its neighbors. Political realities for 
Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine, which are examined in the scenario, different between 
each other. For Israel to use this scenario, it has to have an ad hoc approach to for each 
country to use natural gas for conflict resolution purposes.  
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Economic feasibility of Turkey scenario is the most attractive option for Israel 
among other scenarios listed in Chapter Two but its realization is highly dependent on 
the change of political behavior in Turkish and Israeli sides. Domestic politics play a 
key role on scenarios viability.  
Scenario that deals with Floating LNG facility does not give us a clear picture 
whether FLNG facilities are feasible or not due to it being an untested new 
technological development. Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline Project is an interesting 
scenario that involves Israel, Cyprus and Greece to build a pipeline and carry Eastern 
Mediterranean gas to European Union. Politically, other than possible objections and 
actions by Turkey, there are no obstacles to build such a pipeline but economically it is 
not a feasible option for Israel to choose. Vassilikos scenario’s economic feasibility 
depends on arrival of additional Israeli gas as LNG facilities themselves would be too 
costly for Cyprus if it only receives Cypriot gas. 
Historical past of Israel and Cyprus with other regional countries affect the 
options they can choose to export their natural gas. Divided status of Cyprus removes 
options, which were not discussed in this thesis, which could be the most economically 
efficient option for Cypriot gas. Turkey disregards any natural gas proposal that would 
come from Cyprus before the long lasting solution to the island happens. Israel’s 
problematic relationship with Turkey forces it to consider other options and diverge its 
focus from an economically most reasonable option by building pipelines through 
Turkey to other options which carry risks for both Israel’s economic and security 
spheres.   
This thesis tried to explain geopolitical effects of recent offshore Israeli and 
Cypriot natural gas discoveries by examining several countries histories, their natural 
gas capabilities and scenarios that main natural gas actors can implement. All the 
scenarios carry potential political and economic risks as well as benefits for both the 
Israel and Cyprus. Israeli policy decisions with regard to natural gas will play a key role 
for determination of the region’s geopolitics as the entire Eastern Mediterranean natural 
gas story is about Israel because it has majority of the gas reserves in the region that can 
change geopolitical dynamics. 
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